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A Cry for Compassion: Fear of AIDS in
Pennsylvania
INTRODUCTION
Today, nearly a million people are living in the United States
with the human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") and acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome ("AIDS").' Roughly 27,000 of those
living with HIV/AIDS are located in Pennsylvania.2 Since the first
reported case of AIDS in 1981,' nearly a half million people have
succumbed to the disease.4 Though the number of cases of infec-
tion and AIDS-related deaths increased throughout the first dec-
ade of the disease, both the number of new cases and deaths have
declined since that time.5 However, there has been a recent resur-
gence of the HIV epidemic among homosexual men.6
1. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Division for HIVIAIDS Prevention:
Basic Statistics, at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats.htm (last visited May 13, 2003). The cu-
mulative number of AIDS cases reported to the CDC as of December 2001 was 816,149, of
which 666,026 were male, 141,048 female, and 9,079 were children under 13 years of age.
Id.
2. Id. Pennsylvania is ranked sixth among the states for the number of cumulative
AIDS cases with 26,369 cases reported as of December 2001. Id. Of those, nearly 78% are
residents of the Philadelphia area. Id.
3. Debbie E. Lanin, The Fear of Disease as a Compensable Injury: An analysis of
Claims Based on AIDS Phobia, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 77, 89 (1993). See also Center for
Disease Control and Prevention, The HIVIAIDS Epidemic: The First 10 Years, 40
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 357 (1991). The first cases of AIDS were reported by
health-care providers in California and the Centers for Disease Control. Id. By the end of
1981, there were 189 cases reported from 15 states and the District of Columbia. Center
for Disease Control and Prevention, Current Trends Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome - United States, 1981 - 1990, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 358 (1991).
It is estimated that there are approximately 42 million people worldwide living with
HIV/AIDS. See CDC Basic Statistics, supra note 1.
4. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Revised Guidelines for HIV Counseling,
Testing, and Referral and Revised Recommendations for HIV Screening of Pregnant
Women, 50 (No. RR-19) MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 4 (2001). As of December
2001, there have been 467,910 cumulative AIDS related deaths reported to the CDC, a
fraction of the estimated 3.1 million AIDS-related deaths occurring during 2002 worldwide.
See CDC Basic Statistics, supra note 1.
5. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, HIV and AIDS: United States, 1981 -
2000, 50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 430 (2001). The number of persons living
with AIDS is the highest ever reported in the United States. Id. The increase in survival
rates is attributed to both advances in HV prevention and treatments. Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, CDC HIVIAIDS Update: A Glance at the HIV Epidemic, at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/news/At-a-Glance.pdf (last visited June 11, 2002).
6. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, HIV Incidence Among Young Men Who
Have Sex With Men - Seven U.S. Cities, 1994 - 2000, 50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
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AIDS is a disorder of the immune system caused by infection
with HIV.7 There is generally a latency period where the virus
may lay dormant in the body for years without symptoms of ill-
ness.' HIV destroys CD4 +T cells, referred to as helper cells,
which are crucial to the normal functioning of the human immune
system.9 A strong correlation between the amount of HIV in one's
blood stream and the reduction of helper cells is recognized as an
indicator of the onset of AIDS. ° HIV is primarily transmitted
through sexual contact with an infected person, by sharing nee-
dles and syringes with an infected person, or through infected
pregnant and/or nursing mothers."
Due to the vast amounts of publicity the virus has received,
many people fear for their lives when there is a possibility that
they have been exposed to the virus. While many courts recognize
concern over being infected with HIV as a legitimate fear and al-
low claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED")
to go forward, other courts require the potentially infected person
to perform due diligence. Due diligence generally requires the
plaintiff to consult relevant medical information to become famil-
iar with the realities of the disease in order to ensure that the fear
is objectively rational. 2 For a fear to be considered objectively ra-
tional, one may have to show actual exposure to the virus, prove a
recognized channel of transmission, and provide evidence that
there is a statistical likelihood that he/she may become infected
through their exposure to the virus.
This comment is organized into several different parts. First, it
addresses the three legal theories of recovery for fear of AIDS
claims. Next, it discusses Pennsylvania's acknowledgement of a
fear of AIDS claim and the refusal of Pennsylvania courts to grant
REP. 440 (2001). Of the cases reported, male-to-male sex is considered the most common
mode of exposure. See HIV and AIDS: United States, 1981 - 2000, supra note 5, at 430.
7. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Division for H1VIAIDS Prevention:
Questions and Answers: HIV is the Cause of AIDS, at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/cause.htm (last visited June 11, 2002).
8. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 329 (Md. 1993). The latency period may be ten
years or longer, where the infected person is able to function normally. Id.
9. See CDC Questions and Answers, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. Id. The known bodily fluids which have been proven as a mode of transmission for
the virus include blood, semen, vaginal fluid, breast milk, and other bodily fluids containing
blood. Id. It's also been recognized that the following fluids may transmit the virus: fluid
surrounding the brain and spinal cord, fluid surrounding bone joints, and fluid surrounding
an unborn baby. Id.
12. Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31 F.3d 1197, 1201 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1079 (1995).
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recovery under theories derived from asbestos litigation. Third, it
analyzes the deconstruction of the impact rule, upon which the
fear of AIDS claims were decided, and the exceptions which would
grant recovery under the zone of danger and bystander recovery
theories. Following the deconstruction of the impact rule, the de-
bate on whether Pennsylvania recognizes a fear of AIDS claim,
brought under a negligent infliction of emotional distress theory,
concludes with Pennsylvania granting recovery with their adop-
tion of the actual exposure rule. Lastly, an attempt will be made
to persuade the Pennsylvania courts to modify their current crite-
ria for fear of AIDS recovery to an approach that is more in line
with today's medical knowledge of the disease.
I. THE THREE THEORIES OF RECOVERY FOR FEAR OF AIDS
When bringing a claim based on infliction of emotional distress
related to a fear of contracting AIDS, the courts have recognized
three prevalent theories for recovery. The first theory, recognized
by a majority of the jurisdictions, necessitates that one has actu-
ally been exposed to the virus in order to bring suit."3 This is
known as the "actual exposure" rule, 4 and absent proof of actual
exposure, one's fear of contracting AIDS is considered unreason-
able. 5
The adoption of the "actual exposure" rule by the majority of ju-
risdictions reflects several public policy concerns." First, it en-
sures that the fear is not premised on misconceptions about AIDS,
but rather based on a genuine concern. 7 Next, it "ensures stabil-
ity, consistency and predictability in the disposition" of emotional
distress cases. 8 It also ensures that those actually exposed to HIV
are compensated for the their emotional distress." Lastly it pro-
tects the judicial system from frivolous lawsuits. °
The second theory, considered a more liberal approach, allows
recovery where the plaintiffs fear of contracting AIDS is reason-
13. Pendergist v. Pengergrass, 961 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
14. Pendergist, 961 S.W.2d at 924.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 926.
17. Id. (citing Brown v. New York Health and Hosp. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996)).
18. Id. (citing K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Minn. 1995)).
19. Pendergist, 961 S.W.2d at 926 (citing Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 179
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994)).
20. Id. (citing Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 886).
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able. 1 Presenting proof of possible exposure, rather than actual
exposure to HIV, is sufficient to show that one's fear of contracting
AIDS is reasonable.22 Recovery is generally limited to the period
of time between the event where exposure is alleged to have oc-
curred and the time the plaintiff knew, or had reason to know,
that he/she did not test positive for the disease.23 Courts adhering
to the reasonable fear approach generally limit recovery to six
months since there is a 95% certainty that one will test positive
after six months from the initial exposure.24 The Center for Dis-
ease Control ("CDC") has recently concluded that HIV testing is
now at least 95% accurate in a three-month period from the initial
exposure, which theoretically would shorten the recovery period
even further.25
The reasonable fear approach is largely based on the "massive
informational campaign waged by the Federal, State, and local
health officials ... to educate the public."16 The justification is that
a reasonable person who has been exposed to this information may
develop a fear of AIDS when there is a recognized channel of
transmission for the disease, such as being stuck by a needle. 7
Generally, when an individual has been potentially exposed to the
virus, he/she is informed to live their life as if they are living with
AIDS as a precautionary measure.28 Being told to live one's life as
if he/she is living with AIDS only enforces the rationale behind the
reasonable fear approach.
The third theory, recognized only by California courts, is re-
ferred to as the "more likely than not" standard.2 9  Here, actual
exposure is a prerequisite; however, the plaintiff bears a height-
ened burden of proving that their fear stems from knowledge, cor-
roborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion, that it is more
21. Id. at 925.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1207 (holding that once there is proof to a medical
certainty that one has not been exposed to nor will develop the disease, any continuing fear
is unreasonable); Faya, 620 A.2d at 337 (holding that continued fear of contracting AIDS
may be unreasonable after testing negative over a year after exposure)).
24. Faya, 620 A.2d at 337; see infra note 38.
25. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Sexually Transmitted Diseases Treat-
ment Guidelines 2002, 51 (No. RR-6) MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 8 (2002).
26. Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 153 Misc. 2d 1, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
27. Castro, 153 Misc. 2d at 6.
28. See Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1201 (plaintiff was advised by a physician to abstain from
sexual relations with his wife); See also Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 882 (hospital advised plain-
tiff to assume that she was HIV positive, to take AZT tablets, to use condoms when having
sex, and to avoid kissing family members and sharing utensils).
29. Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178.
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likely than not that one will become HIV positive and develop
AIDS as a result of exposure." With the reliability of testing to-
day, it would be nearly impossible to recover under such a high
standard of probability unless one has tested positive.
The "more likely than not" standard recognizes that everyone is
aware of, and worried about, the possibility of developing this dis-
ease from exposure to HIV.3" The second concern raised in defense
of this heightened standard was the "unduly detrimental impact
that unrestricted fear of liability would have in the health care
field."32 The next policy concern was the potential detriment to
those who were exposed and ultimately develop the disease, if all
persons fearing disease were afforded unrestricted redress.33
Lastly, the court found the heightened standard necessary to pro-
mote early resolution of fear of AIDS claims by establishing a "suf-
ficiently definite and predictable threshold for recovery to permit
consistent application from case to case."
34
II. PENNSYLVANIA ACKNOWLEDGES A "FEAR OF AIDS" CLAIM BUT
REFUSES RECOVERY
In 1993, the Pennsylvania Superior Court first recognized a
"fear of AIDS" claim when it decided Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein
Medical Center.35 During the testing of donated placental blood,
which was used in the in vitro fertilization procedure, the plaintiff
was informed that the blood had tested positive for the AIDS anti-
body, HTLV-III. 36 HTLV-III has been recognized as the cause of
30. Id. at 179.
31. Id. at 178 (citing Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 863 P.2d 795, 812 (Cal.
1993)).
32. Id. (quoting Potter, 863 P.2d at 812).
33. Id. (citing Potter, 863 P.2d at 813).
34. Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178 (quoting Potter, 863 P.2d at 813).
35. 623 A.2d 3, 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (noting that whether a fear of AIDS claim is a
compensable injury was an issue of first impression in the Commonwealth).
36. Lubowitz, 623 A.2d at 4. The hospital performed an enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay ("ELISA") test, which screens for the antibodies sensitive to HTLV-III, on the do-
nated placental blood. Id. This test standing alone is 98.6% effective in detecting exposure
to AIDS. Kozup v. Georgetown University, 663 F.Supp. 1048, 1053 (D.D.C. 1987) affd in
part, vacated on other grounds, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing David A. Roling,
Comment, Transfusion-Associated Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Blood
Bank Liability?, 16 U. BALT. L. REV. 81, 86 & n.36. (1986)).
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AIDS.37 Both the donor and the plaintiff tested negative for the
AIDS antibody when tested six months later, as did their child. 8
The Medical Center contended that the original test resulted in
a "false positive" and that the plaintiff was never actually exposed
to the AIDS virus." According to the plaintiff, she experienced
both mental distress and physical ailments as a result of the first
positive results.4' Deciding the case under the law surrounding
asbestos claims,4 the court held that one could only be compen-
sated for a disease which existed at the time of trial, and since she
was never exposed to the AIDS virus, she could not be compen-
37. Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1052 (citing Peter J. Fischinger, Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome: The Causative Agent and the Evolving Perspective, 9 CURRENT PROBLEMS
IN CANCER 4 (1985); Thomas C. Quinn, Editorial, Perspectives on the Future of AIDS, 253 J.
AM.MED.A. 247 (1985)). While the courts continue to acknowledge HTLV-III as the cause
of AIDS, the medical profession considers the usage of HTLV passe. According to Dr.
James Satriano, Director of HIV/ADS Programs, New York State Office of Mental Health,
Robert Gallo, while working at the Institute of Allergy and Infections Diseases in the
United States was briefly heralded as a co-discoverer of the AIDS virus along with Luc
Montaginer, from the Pasteur Institute in France. It was Luc Montaginer who first an-
nounced the discovery of the virus, which he labeled LAV, lymphadenotrophic associated
virus, while Robert Gallo, shortly thereafter, announced the discovery of a virus which he
called HTLV-III, human t-cell lymphotrophic virus. It was subsequently determined that
Gallo's virus was cultured from a sample which Montaginer had sent to him, resulting in a
patent infringement suit, and the renaming of the virus to HIV. E-mail from James Satri-
ano, Ph.D., Director of HIV/AIDS Programs, New York State Office of Mental Health; Re-
search Scientist, New York State Psychiatric Institute (July 18, 2002) (on file with author).
38. Lubowitz, 623 A.2d at 4. Both samples were subject to an ELISA test and a West-
ern Blot analysis. Id. When the two tests are used in conjunction the detection rate in-
creases to 99.9%. Faya, 620 A.2d at 332 n.4 (citing U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Voluntary HIV Counseling and Testing: Facts, Issues, and Answers (1991); Kozup,
663 F.Supp. at 1052-53). See also Doyle v. Home Office Reference Laboratory, No.
CIV.A.89-243 ERIE, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5850, *7 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (citing Donald S.
Burke, et. al, Measurement of the False Positive Rate in a Screening Program for Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infections, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 961 (1988)). The ELISA-
Western Blot testing is recognized by the Center for Disease Control, the American Red
Cross, and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research as the standard in determining
HIV infection. Doyle, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5850, at *6-7. While the ELISA test is a
screening test, the Western Blot is a confirmatory test. K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553,
557 n.5 (Minn. 1995).
39. Lubowitz, 623 A.2d at 4. A "false positive" is a positive test result for a person who
is not actually infected. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Revised Guidelines for
HIV Counseling, Testing, and Referral and Revised Recommendations for HIV Screening of
Pregnant Women, supra note 4, at 54.
40. Lubowitz, 623 A.2d at 4.
41. Id. The court makes reference to cases which involve "risk of contracting disease"
claims. Id. at 5 (citing Ottavio v. Fiberboard Corp. 617 A.2d 1296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992);
Altiere v. Fibreboard Corp., 617 A.2d 1302 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Marinari v. Asbestos
Corp. 612 A.2d 1021 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
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sated based on her fear of developing AIDS.42 Adopting an actual
exposure rule, the court's decision mandated that one could not
bring a fear of AIDS claim unless one has actually tested positive.
This followed the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania's ruling in Burk v. Sage Products, Inc."
decided three years prior to the Lubowitz decision.
In Burk, a paramedic brought suit against the manufacturer
and distributor of a container designed for the disposal and con-
tainment of used medical syringes." The paramedic alleged that
he was pricked by a needle protruding from the container, and had
developed various ailments stemming from his fear of contracting
AIDS.45 No proof was presented that the needles were actually
used on an AIDS patient, although it was alleged that there were
several AIDS patients on the hospital floor, where the container
was located.46 Despite being tested for HIV antibodies on five
separate occasions, the paramedic never tested positive.47
The district court, acknowledging that the Pennsylvania courts
had recognized a cause of action for emotional fear for contracting
a disease, found that the paramedic failed to establish actual ex-
posure to the virus, and, since he had never tested positive, his
case was without merit.4" The paramedic claimed that although
he had tested negative, there was a medical uncertainty whether
he would develop the virus in the future.49 Putting such uncer-
tainty to rest, the district court reasoned that it was a medically
accepted fact that, although one showed no signs of being infected
with HIV, a person would still test positive for the HIV antibody
during this period, and it was extremely unlikely that a person
42. Lubowitz, 623 A.2d at 5. The Court however noted that should the plaintiff con-
tract AIDS as a result of the in vitro fertilization procedure she would then have a cause of
action. Id. at n.3.
43. 747 F.Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990) Burk is recognized as the first medical case con-
fronting the exposure or transmission of HIV in a "fear of AIDS" context. Robert C. Bollin-
ger, Commentary, On the Road to Recovery for Emotional Harm: Is the Fear of AIDS a
Legally Compensable Injury?, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 417, 427 (1995).
44. Burk, 285 F.Supp. at 286.
45. Id. at 286.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 286-87 (noting that not a single jurisdiction has permitted recovery for emo-
tional distress for fear of contracting disease when exposure to an agent which has the
potential to cause the disease has not been proven).
49. Burk, 285 F.Supp. at 288.
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testing negative after six months from the initial exposure would
contract the disease from that exposure.0
III. THE DECONSTRUCTION OF THE IMPACT RULE
According to Burk, there cannot be recovery related to a fear of
disease absent physical injury where the injury fails to arise from
the exposure to the disease.5 ' This follows what had been consid-
ered a well-established rule in Pennsylvania, that there could be
no recovery for mental or emotional distress, unless accompanied
by physical injury or impact.52 The "impact rule," as it became
known,53 was first announced by the English courts in 1888."4
Justice Musmanno in opposition to such a hard and fast rule, con-
tinually asked the Pennsylvania courts to take the lead and adopt
the rule declared by the Restatement Second of Torts.5 In support
of adopting section 436(2) of the Restatement, Justice Musmanno
relied on its nearly-unified support in legal texts and in a majority
of the states. 6 It was not until the Pennsylvania Superior Court
50. Id. at 288 (citing Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Interpretation and Use
of the Western Blot Assay for Serodiagnosis of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 Infec-
tions, 38 (No. S-7) MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 6 (1989). Ninety-five percent of
those infected with HIV will test positive within six months of exposure to the virus.
Pendergist, 961 S.W.2d at 922 (citing Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d 880).
51. Griffin v. American Red Cross, No. CIV.A.93-5924, 1994 WL 675105, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) (citing Burk, 747 F.Supp. at 287; Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d
271, 274 (3d. Cir. 1985), appealed after remand, 812 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1987)).
52. See Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 112 A.2d 100, 104 (Pa. 1955), overruled by Nied-
erman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970).
53. Knaub v. Gotwalt, 220 A.2d 646, 648 (Pa 1966) (Musmanno, J. dissenting), over-
ruled by Niederman, 261 A.2d 84.
54. Niederman, 261 A.2d at 86 n.2 (citing Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coul-
tas, 13 App. & Cas. 222 (1888)). The rule was abandoned in England thirteen years later.
Id. (citing Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 699 (1901)).
55. Potere, 112 A.2d at 104 (Musmanno, J., concurring) (noting that a person could
suffer severe traumatic emotional shock without physical impact or injury); Bosley v. An-
drews, 142 A.2d 263, 280 (Pa. 1958) (Musmanno, J., dissenting), overruled by Niederman,
261 A.2d 84 (noting that the majority's decision was "insupportable in law, logic, and ele-
mentary justice" and would "continue to dissent from it until the cows come home.");
Knaub, 220 A.2d at 649 (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he rule that there must
be the mechanical requirement of impact, before recovery will be permitted, charges with
lowered head against the stone wall of the most elementary phenomena observable practi-
cally every day.").
56. Bosley, 142 A.2d at 278 (Musmanno, J., dissenting) Section 436(2) states:
[i]f the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily
harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar
and immediate emotional disturbances, the fact that such harm results solely from
the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the
actor from liability.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(2) (1965).
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decided Niederman v. Brosky57 in 1970 that the court created an
exception to the impact rule. 8
Mr. Niederman had been walking with his son when a vehicle,
driven in a "reckless and negligent manner," skidded onto the
sidewalk and hit a fire hydrant within feet of Mr. Niederman.
Since Mr. Niederman was not struck by the vehicle, the physical
impact necessary for recovery of emotional distress under the im-
pact rule was lacking.59 Abandoning the impact rule, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania adopted what has become known as the
"zone of danger" theory. ° The "zone of danger" exception allows
recovery for emotional distress in the absence of physical impact
where the plaintiff was in personal danger of physical impact and
actually feared the physical impact.61
Despite broadening the recovery for emotional distress with the
Niederman decision, less than a decade later the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court found that the "zone of danger" exception was just
as unnecessarily restrictive." Sinn v. Burd"3 is recognized as an-
other exception to the "impact rule."' Here, the mother of two
small children witnessed a vehicle strike and kill her daughter
outside of their family's home.65 The mother witnessed the acci-
dent through the front door of their home 6 and was determined
not to be within the "zone of danger." 7 The court, adopting what is
known as "bystander recovery," recognized what has been consid-
ered a three-part test." Sinn requires that the person seeking
redress be a close family member, whose location was near the
scene of the accident, and where the emotional distress is a direct
result of observing the accident.
57. 261 A.2d 84.
58. Id. at 85 (announcing that "[t]oday the cows come home" paying homage to Justice
Musmanno's dissent in Bosley (see supra note 55)).
59. Id. at 84-85 (noting that the impact rule provides that there can be no recovery for
the consequences of emotional distress absent a contemporaneous impact).
60. Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 676 (Pa. 1979).
61. Niederman, 261 A.2d at 90.
62. Sinn, 404 A.2d at 677.
63. 404 A.2d 672.
64. Stoddard v. Davidson, 513 A.2d 419, 421 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
65. Sinn, 404 A.2d at 674.
66. Id. at 674.
67. Id. at 686.
68. Id. See also Stoddard, 513 A.2d at 422.
69. Id. at 421. See also Neffv. Lasso, 555 A.2d 1304, 1308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal
denied, 565 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1989).
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IV. THE STALEMATE OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS IN AIDS CASES
Six months prior to the Burk decision, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania was faced
with the question of whether one could recover under the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress theory where physical impact
was lacking.7 ° Arguing that Sinn made such a recovery permissi-
ble,71 the plaintiff attempted to bring suit because he allegedly suf-
fered emotional distress when he was misinformed that he had
tested positive for HIV.72
The plaintiff had recently undergone blood work as a prerequi-
site to applying for a life insurance policy. 7 Upon the initial test-
ing he was informed, in writing, that he had tested reactive for
HTLV-III, indicating exposure to HIV.74 The plaintiff had a sec-
ond blood test taken by an independent physician which indicated
that he was HIV negative. 75 The district court, finding no basis of
recovery based on the Sinn decision, held that the plaintiff must
assert a physical impact to recover under a theory of NIED.6
Four years later, in Griffin v. American Red Cross,77 the Eastern
District Court of Pennsylvania reiterated that there could be no
recovery without an accompanying physical injury arising from
actual exposure to the disease.78 Ms. Griffin had donated blood to
the American Red Cross to be used in an upcoming surgery that
she had scheduled.79 Ms. Griffin had been advised by her physi-
cian to donate her blood in order to avoid the possibility of a trans-
fusion-related illness." A few weeks later, her physician informed
her that she had tested HIV positive.81 A second test was then
70. Doyle, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5850, at *3.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *2.
73. Id. at *1.
74. Id. at *1-2. Upon reviewing his results, the plaintiff called the testing facility to
confirm that the results were accurate, which the testing facility confirmed. Id. at *2. See
supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text for discussion on HTLV-III.
75. Doyle, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5850, at *2.
76. Id. at *4. The district court did allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint under a
theory of contributory negligence, based on the laboratory's duty to perform accurate test-
ing, since the NIED claim had failed. Id. at *5.
77. 1994WL675105.
78. Griffin, 1994 WL 675105, at *2 (citing Burk, 747 F.Supp. at 287; Wisniewski, 759
F.2d at 274).
79. Id. at *1.
80. Id.
81. Id. There was conflicting testimony that the Red Cross told the physician that
Griffin was positive for HTLV I, and not HTLV III, however, the physician informed Griffin
574 Vol. 41
Fear of AIDS in Pennsylvania
administered by her physician which indicated that she was HIV
negative.82 The district court, agreeing with the American Red
Cross, found that Pennsylvania did not recognize a cause of action
for NIED based on a fear of AIDS.83
In Rothschild v. Tower Air, Inc.,8' the Eastern District court
found that one cannot go untested, when claiming emotional dis-
tress. 85 There, a passenger on a flight from Tel Aviv to New York,
when reaching into the magazine pouch in front of her seat, was
stabbed in the finger by a hypodermic needle located inside the
magazine pouch.86 HIV tests the following day proved to be nega-
tive, but thereafter she was never retested. Her case rested on
the presumption that she may have been exposed to the AIDS vi-
rus, and further testing may result in testing positive."
The district court held that her argument was "purely specula-
tive" and without proof that she was exposed to the AIDS virus,
her suit must fail.89 These "false positive" tests, which may be cor-
rected through subsequent testing, provide only a mistaken belief
that there was an exposure to the AIDS virus, rather than meet-
ing the required "actual exposure" criteria.9"
V. PENNSYLVANIA GRANTS RECOVERY FOR FEAR OF AIDS WHILE
ADOPTING THE ACTUAL EXPOSURE RULE
It was not until 1996 that a plaintiff actually recovered under a
fear of AIDS claim in Pennsylvania. In Murphy v. Abbott Labora-
tories,9 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, relying upon the impact rule, allowed recovery for a
registered nurse's claim of NIED despite the defendant's assertion
that she was HIV positive. Id. The result of the second test, showing that Griffin was HIV
negative, was given to her within 24 hours from the time she was misinformed that she had
tested positive. Id.
82. Id.
83. Griffin, 1994 WL 675105, at *2.
84. No. CIV. A. 94-2656, 1995 WL 71053 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
85. Rothschild, 1995 WL 71053, at *3.
86. Id. at *1.
87. Id. at *3.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Millikan v. Holy Spirit Hospital, 27 Pa. D&C 4th 481, 486 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996)
(holding that recovery be limited to the medical costs necessary to determine that one was
not HIV positive after being given the positive testing results of another patient).
91. 930 F.Supp. 1083 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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that Pennsylvania did not recognize a cause of action for fear of
contracting AIDS.92
The nurse was pricked with a needle that was being used on a
patient known to be HIV positive.93 No proof was presented that
the nurse had ever tested positive for HIV, nor was it alleged that
she was even tested for HIV.94 The needle was used to administer
an antibiotic to an AIDS patient, and immediately after adminis-
tering the shot, the nurse stuck her hand with the needle. 5 Dis-
tinguishing this "fear of AIDS" case from other cases, the district
court acknowledged that here there was ample proof she had been
exposed to HIV, and the needle stick was proof of a physical in-
jury.
96
More recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Shumosky v.
Lutheran Welfare Services of Northeastern PA, Inc., dealing with
facts similar to those in Murphy, held that "parasitic damages for
fear of AIDS are available where there is a verifiable causal con-
nection between the injury and the possible development of
AIDS".97
Shumosky was a licensed practical nurse contracted through a
nursing agency to provide nursing care for Lutheran Welfare Ser-
vices." Shumosky alleged that she was never informed that the
patient she was treating had AIDS,99 and had she been so in-
formed, she would not have accepted the'assignment.' ° While
providing home care for the AIDS patient, she accidentally pricked
her finger with a needle that had just been used to administer an
injection to the patient.'0 '
On appeal from a trial court decision holding that Pennsylvania
did not recognize a cause of action based on a fear of contracting
AIDS,0 2 the superior court found that Pennsylvania recognized
92. Murphy, 930 F.Supp. at 1086.
93. Id. at 1084. Despite being designed, manufactured and sold to the Philadelphia
hospital where Mrs. Murphy was employed, as being a "needleless system" Mrs. Murphy
was stuck in her hand with the needleless needle. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1085.
96. Id. at 1087.
97. 784 A.2d 196, 201 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
98. Shumosky, 784 A.2d at 198.
99. Id. at 198. The patient was a home care patient of Lutheran Welfare Services, who
died a few days after the incident occurred from AIDS related complications. Id.
100. Id. at 200.
101. Id. at 198.
102. Id. at 199.
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such a cause of action under the impact rule."°3 The court found
that not only was actual exposure to HIV a prerequisite for a fear
of AIDS claim, but that a scientifically-accepted channel of trans-
mission was also required.' Although Shumosky never tested
positive for HIV, nor developed AIDS,"5 the court found that she
had adequately shown that she had been exposed to the virus, and
that being pricked by a needle just used on an infected patient was
a scientifically-accepted channel of transmission. 6
CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to hear a "fear of
AIDS" case, and there is no indication of how it would apply the
actual exposure rule. It is far reaching to think that the court at
this time would adopt anything other than the actual exposure
rule that has been applied by the superior court to date, but it
would not be unreasonable for them to limit the rule further.
Recognizing a cause of action for fear of AIDS under the impact
rule has limited fear of AIDS claims to incidents where actual ex-
posure to HIV can be linked to a physical impact or injury, such as
a needle prick. In addition to actual exposure, a scientifically ac-
cepted channel of transmission must also be proven. These re-
quirements force the claimant to become familiar with the reali-
ties of the disease by performing due diligence.
Although the eastern district court has found that one cannot go
untested when claiming emotional distress, 7 this ruling seems to
be unfounded under the current state of the law. It appears all
that is required is proof of physical impact or injury, a scientifi-
cally-recognized channel of transmission, and proof of actual expo-
sure. There is no requirement that one actually test positive to
have a cognizable fear of developing AIDS.
The courts must limit fear of AIDS recovery to be more consis-
tent with medically recognized advancements. Testing is now 95%
accurate within a three-month period from the initial exposure, ' °8
103. Shumosky, 784 A.2d at 200.
104. Id. at 201. The court placed reliance on the majority view accepted by other juris-
dictions adhering to the actual exposure rule, requiring proof of a scientifically accepted
channel of transmission be shown for one's fear of contracting AIDS be considered reason-
able. Id. at 202.
105. Id. at 199.
106. Id. at 202.
107. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
Spring 2003 577
Duquesne Law Review
whereas, until recently, the same 95% accuracy rate was accepted
as accurate for a six-month period."9 Since claimants are required
to perform due diligence in proving a claim, the newly-published
findings should persuade claimants that their fear is irrational
after the three-month period, and therefore recovery should be
limited to what is medically accepted.
Since the tests are only 95% accurate, one may question
whether such a limitation should be applied when there is a 5%
likelihood that one is infected but tests negative. Courts that have
addressed this issue adhere to the theory that if one does test
positive, he/she can bring a fear of AIDS suit at that point, al-
though they may have tested positive outside of the three-month
period. This seems to be the most balanced approach to allow one
to claim recovery for a legitimate fear while recognizing advance-
ments in testing.
Andrew M. Satriano
109. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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